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It has been fifteen years since the birth of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which 
marked the apogee of United States-driven, neoconservative economic globalization; 
nine years since Osama bin Laden’s attacks on New York and Washington, which 
laid a terrorism-obsessed, border-raising paradigm on top of the previous market- 
liberalizing, border-lowering paradigm; and two years since the collapse of the 
American financial system, which heralded China’s entry onto the world’s stage as its 
next political and economic giant.
It may therefore appear disconnected from present reality to focus the 
Viscount Bennett Lecture on such a clichéd subject as globalization’s constitutional 
challenges. But for a Faculty of Law that considers Canada’s position in the world 
through the lens of legal theory, globalization still presents a legion o f conceptual and 
normative puzzles that cry out for a comprehensive, interdisciplinary analysis that is 
capable o f guiding the policies of Canada’s governments and channelling the energies 
of Canadian citizens toward the effective but urgent action needed to correct the 
perilous imbalances that threaten the sustainability of human society on our planet.I 
will defend this broad claim first by explaining my approach to the phenomena known 
as globalization; second, laying out the framework that defines the still dominant, 
exclusively domestic conceptualization of constitutionalism in the legal academy; 
and third, elaborating on the evidence that the world’s constitution has produced 
dangerous asymmetries that are being operationalized by states and market players. 
Finally, I will make a properly Canadian—that is, muted—call for both governments 
and citizens to work toward a new paradigm so that our governments and citizens can 
contribute constructively and deliberately to saving our still-resourceful planet.
The thirty-first annual Viscount Bennett Memorial Lecture was delivered by Professor 
Stephen Clarkson from the University of Toronto at the University of New Brunswick 
Faculty of Law on March 18, 2010.
I. GLOBALIZATION: THE CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGE
• Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ensuing end of the Cold 
War, we have required a new label—globalization—to make sense 
of everything happening beyond national control. Most of the many 
aspects of what we have called globalization are obvious as soon 
as they are stated: political globalization, the rise of transnational 
political regimes in which corporations, civil society organizations 
and governments establish new norms for global trade, environment 
and human rights.
• Economic globalization: lightning-fast flows of currencies, a 
spectacular increase in transnational investment and a dramatic 
expansion of world trade in goods and services.
• Societal globalization: massive movements of peoples, transnational 
networks of activists and a transformative proliferation of personal 
interaction in cyberspace.
• Technological globalization: the instantaneous worldwide 
communications networks now provided by information technology, 
employed particularly in the industrialized world.
• Medical globalization: societies’ increasing vulnerability to 
epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, SARS or influenza, the devastation 
of which respects no borders.
• Cultural globalization: the increasing global domination of 
American (and to a lesser extent European) entertainment industries 
and cultural products.
• Ecological globalization: the emergence and rapid intensification of 
environmental trends, from ozone depletion to climate change to 
biodiversity loss.
Criminal globalization: spreading networks of sex trade, narcotics 
trafficking and terrorism, as well as the rise of white-collar corporate 
crime employing sophisticated tools and having transnational 
effects.
• Military globalization: the rise of “humanitarian intervention;” 
the War on Terror; the Iraq invasion and resulting civil strife; a
burgeoning global arms trade and the presence of Canadian troops 
in Afghanistan, Haiti and other states tom apart by conflict, crime 
or corruption.
• The globalization of consciousness: a growing collective 
consciousness of humanity, the planet earth and its ecosystems as a 
single community with a shared fate.
• Ideological globalization: militant Islam, Christian fundamentalism 
and other radical doctrines that proselytize across all borders.
Irreducibly heterogeneous, inherently dynamic, and fundamentally contested 
in all its meanings, globalization’s analysis must be sensitive to the conflicts generated 
by efforts to facilitate, reverse or even merely to understand its various manifestations. 
The purpose of this text is to propose a legal-economic-political framework with 
which to make sense of the phenomenon’s chief characteristics in order to point the 
way forward to resolving its most dangerous contradictions.
During those first, optimistic years—after the collapse of the Soviet bloc but 
before ethnic cleansing and global terrorism painted “globalization” with a darker 
face—the label was a corollary for American triumphalism, which was celebrated 
ideationally as the victory of liberal capitalism and even the “end of history.” In the 
grimmer, post post-Cold War first years of the 21st century, when the United States 
lost its moral leadership, military invincibility and economic hegemony, it has been 
easy to focus on the bleaker and more immediate realities of terrorism and dismiss 
neoconservative globalization as a historical phase now transcended. We should not 
be in such a hurry to wipe out the recent past.
At its launch in 1995, the WTO was eulogized as an almost utopian, world- 
federalist forerunner of global governance. After all, it gave concrete expression to 
mankind’s yearning for universal rights and the global rule of law. It was based on 
the principle of freedom. It approximated Karl Marx’s dream about replacing the 
management of men with the administration o f  things, a minimal state machinery 
having been set up to steer the market’s free hand as it lifted human welfare to ever 
dizzier heights.
The catch lay not in the WTO’s logic but in its asymmetry. The rights it 
proclaimed were only for transnational corporations (TNCs), not for citizens. The 
laws were certainly universal, but they promoted a deregulated marketplace, not 
coordinated global governance. The principle of freedom operationalized by its rules 
was to extend the global sway of already powerful TNCs, not to empower the wretched 
of the earth. The administration of things was an efficacious dispute-settlement process
designed to resolve international conflicts between corporations and governments, not 
to ensure environmental survival or human justice.
This most powerful, most novel, and, for many, most disturbing manifestation 
of globalization, which had been immediately celebrated and later vilified, is now 
half forgotten. I believe that the WTO needs to be rescued from its semi-obscurity 
and given its theoretical due, not just because its powers are substantial but because, 
internationally, they diminish the capacities of all other multilateral legal instruments 
and, domestically, they constrain the regulatory state, thereby exacerbating the perilous 
imbalance both within and between states that should become our era’s normative 
concern.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK: THE WORLD’S SUPRA-CONSTITUTION 
AND CANADA’S EXTERNAL CONSTITUTION
For centuries, the legal concept of constitution has been applied to those written 
documents or unwritten conventions that articulated the principles, defined the 
institutions and laid down the rules by which nation states manage their political 
life. During the first five decades after World War II, the proliferating international 
institutions, multilateral agreements and networks of global governance retained 
international law’s traditional respect for national sovereignty. While states may have 
been constrained by the obligations they undertook when signing treaties, they largely 
retained the ability to interpret these obligations to suit their own interests, ignore them 
if they chose and abrogate them if they felt this necessary.
1. Global Supra-constitution
It is hard to deny that the multiplication of international organizations and the production 
of international legal norms over the past sixty-five years have reconstituted the global 
order. Whether these myriad instances of transnational governance and conventions 
comprised a global constitution was another matter, because they were mainly 
premised on the principle of national sovereignty and generally allowed wide latitude 
for states to decide about their individual degrees of participation and compliance.
Fifteen years ago, one could conceivably have performed a mammoth 
exercise to list all the principles enshrined in international documents; detail all the 
rules these contained; lay out all the rights that had been declared and analyse the 
legislative, executive, administrative, judicial and coercive powers of the world’s 
legion transnational institutions. Not only would such an exercise have shown how 
variegated the global governance landscape was, it would have suggested that—with 
the important exception of the weak and impoverished states in the global periphery— 
signatory states were bound by their international obligations to the extent that these 
matched their self-interest, but no further. States could sign and ratify all sorts of
documents, addressing human rights, labour standards, or cultural diversity, without 
feeling the least obligation to respect their resultant commitments. The Government 
of former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien signed the Kyoto Accord, the Government of 
Paul Martin proceeded to ignore it, and the Government of Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper loudly declared it would not respect it.
The argument that this changed in 1995 is largely but not entirely based on the 
WTO’s novel muscularity. To be sure, the Uruguay Round’s eight years of negotiations 
produced some 27,000 pages of norms (national treatment, most-favoured nation), 
rules (on tariffs, services, and state subsidies) and rights (intellectual property). When 
these provisions entered into force in 1995, we introduced such an authoritative 
form of global governance that scholars considered it a try step already in global 
governance. What caused this new incarnation of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) to be branded as a “supra-constitution” was its judicial capacity to 
issue rulings that arbitrated disputes between member-states and its coercive capacity 
to enforce these judgements. It seemed that, overnight, the world community had 
given itself an international organization with constitutional clout in the sense that its 
principles, rules and rights were legitimately established, enjoyed primacy over those 
of its signatories, would be difficult to amend and had effective muscle.
The case that a global supra-constitution is evolving is not limited to the 
WTO’s evolution out of the GATT. Other trends leading in the same direction that 
were nascent during the Cold War have strengthened. State citizens and even non­
signatory states are finding themselves bound by international instruments that would 
previously have been dismissed as irrelevant soft law. Some of those accused of war 
crimes have been brought to justice in The Hague. Organizations set up as creatures 
of nation states (for example, the Codex Alimentarius) or the market (for example, the 
International Organization of Standards) make rulings or regulations by which their 
masters find themselves in practice to be bound. In these largely imperceptible ways,
I argue that a supra-constitution is steadily, if haltingly developing.
2. Domestic External Constitution
The parallel argument at the domestic level is that signatory states now have to 
confront a new legal reality. The fact that they are living under a supra-constitution 
has been evident to scholars of the European Union (EU) for some time. Ipso facto, 
at the national level, the EU’s norm- and rights-setting treaties, directives-issuing 
Commission and directly-effective Court of Justice judgements create for each of its 
member states an external constitution that has to be taken as seriously—sometimes 
more seriously—than their own, previously supreme, domestic constitution.
Recognition that we also have to come to grips with our external constitution 
is growing in Canada as scholars assimilate the significance not just of the WTO
but also of its precursors, the bilateral Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CUFTA) and the continental North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Norms
CUFTA’s extension of the trade principle o f national treatment from goods to 
investment brought a generation of industrial-strategy policies to an end. No longer 
could Ottawa or Fredericton make rules to strengthen the competitive capacities of a 
domestic industry without offering these subsidies or tax concessions to those very 
foreign TNCs with which the local firms had been hoping to compete more effectively. 
Such norms are constitutional in the sense that they enjoy primacy over domestic legal 
principles. Without being written into domestic legislation, national treatment prevails 
in the sense that, should a U.S. corporation consider itself discriminated against by the 
government of New Brunswick, it can request that Washington launch a legal action 
against the government of Canada
Rules
The WTO’s subsidy code enabled Canada to successfully attack Brazil in Geneva 
for subsidizing the international sales of Embraer’s regional aircraft. In this respect, 
the subsidy rule increased Canada’s international capacity. But the code equally 
empowered Brasilia to get the WTO’s dispute-settlement arm to rule that Ottawa’s 
subsidization of Bombardier’s regional jet was illegal. In this respect the subsidy 
rule decreased Canada’s domestic autonomy to make industrial policy. Such rules are 
constitutional not just because they prevail over domestic legislative or administrative 
powers but because they cannot be amended by domestic democratic processes of 
law- and regulation-making.
Rights
NAFTA gave American (and, in principle, Mexican) corporations operating in Canada 
greater rights to sue federal, provincial or municipal governments for alleged acts of 
expropriation than domestically-owned firms enjoy in Canada. The WTO extended to 
the world’s giant pharmaceutical companies such iron-clad intellectual property rights 
to monopolize receipts from their drug patents that it is practically speaking impossible 
for cheap, generic versions of Big Pharma’s medicines to be made available in the 
Third World to battle such pandemics as HIV and AIDS. Such rights are constitutional 
in the sense that they cannot be changed by domestic jurisdictions and that they prevail 
over domestic rights.
Following extensive parliamentary deliberation, the Canadian Charter o f  
Rights and Freedoms, entrenched in the Constitution in 1982, did not declare any 
specific rights to property. Without any serious public discussion apart from the 
fevered partisan debate that dominated the 1988 federal election campaign, Canada’s
external constitution now gives property rights to foreign corporations that exceed the 
rights of domestically owned enterprises.
Arbitration
The constitutional clout of these norms, rules and rights is not only due to their primacy 
over domestic law-making and the difficulty of amending them. They must be ranked 
as part of Canada’s external constitution for two further reasons: first, there are strong 
transnational judicial processes that can make determinations concerning disputes 
among the parties and, second, their rulings are effectively enforced.
Chapter 11 of NAFTA establishes an international, but private, arbitral 
process that enables an aggrieved U.S. corporation to sue a Canadian government to 
get compensation for a regulatory measure it deems tantamount to expropriation. The 
American waste-disposal company S.D. Myers successfully sued Ottawa for having 
disallowed the shipment of PCBs from Canada to S.D. Myers’ waste treatment plant in 
the United States—an interdiction that conformed with the Basel Convention, which 
control’s the export of dangerous chemicals.
The WTO’s dispute settlement procedures provided Washington a legal venue 
for retroactively but successfully challenging a number of federal policies protecting 
the Canadian magazine industry. Declared illegal, for instance, was the postal subsidy 
for domestic magazines that Ottawa had established many decades previously to 
encourage the circulation of domestic magazines in the face of such U.S. industry 
juggernauts as Time and Reader s Digest.
These institutions of transnational justice form part of Canada’s external 
constitution either because they have direct effect domestically or because their 
rulings can otherwise be enforced internationally. In the first instance, Chapter 11 
dispute rulings have direct effect because, for example, should Ottawa have refused 
to comply with the arbitration ruling on S.D. Myers, the U.S. company could have 
obtained satisfaction in Canadian courts.
In the second instance, should a losing defendant state fail to comply with 
a WTO ruling, the plaintiff country would then have the right to retaliate with trade 
sanctions equal to the value of the WTO’s original award. It is this previously non­
existent legitimate right to retaliate that gives the WTO’s elaborate system of norms, 
rules, rights, and arbitral capacity its supra-constitutional bottom line, making it a 
significant element of Canada’s external constitution.
III. THE GLOBAL REGIME’S DANGEROUS IMBALANCES
Various issues confronting the national and the global community can be 
clarified by analysing the last two decades’ transformations of global governance in 
terms of their international and domestic constitutional significance.
1. The Supra-constitution
In the international domain, a tremendous imbalance characterizes the disparity 
between the authoritative, hard-law nature of the WTO’s economic rules and the 
hortatory, soft-law character of most other multilateral agreements.
One question involves the coexistence of different levels of constitutional 
reality, where the norms of one contradict those of another. In one case, the WTO’s 
imperative that quantitative restrictions on farm products be transformed into tariffs 
came into conflict with NAFTA’s injunction that tariffs not be raised. A NAFTA 
dispute panel ruled that the WTO’s provision trumped NAFTA’s.
Even when governments wish to keep their commitments under one 
convention, they may find themselves disabled by another. Many multilateral 
environmental agreements are operationalized in terms of prohibiting such commercial 
transactions as the trade in endangered species or the export of hazardous chemicals. 
But the WTO’s trade-liberalizing regime trumps such non-economic measures. We 
already saw that a NAFTA dispute panel gave no weight to Canada’s commitment not 
to export dangerous chemicals by ruling in favour of “free” trade.
Without rebalancing this discrepancy in powers between the world’s 
economic constitution on the one hand and all other international instruments on the 
other, the liberated forces of the market doom us to a re-run of the financial system’s 
self-destructive proclivities.
2. The External Constitution
Domestically, the tension between a country’s international obligations and its 
domestic practices becomes increasingly difficult to ignore. Even the mighty United 
States has come up against two WTO rulings in favour of its trading partners, in cases 
involving U.S. environmental restrictions meant to save dolphins during Mexican tuna 
fishing and save sea-turtles slaughtered by indiscriminate trawling.
So far, the Supreme Court of Canada has not had to rule on the constitutionality 
of NAFTA’s Chapter 11 dispute settlement process. Chapter 11 gives international 
arbitration processes the power to invalidate federal, provincial or municipal regulations 
without amending the Canadian constitution to devolve this power from the courts. If
Chapter 11 investor-state dispute settlement were deemed unconstitutional, would it 
follow that Canada would have to abrogate NAFTA?
Our analysis has a wider and more nuanced ambition, since we want to trace 
out the empirical implications of the world’s new supra-constitution in its economic 
and political dimensions.
3. Globalization through the Market
It would defy common knowledge to claim that its new external constitution is the 
only constraint limiting the Canadian state’s autonomy. Half of the world’s largest 
economies are transnational corporations; these companies carry out most of the 
world’s trade. Their production chains and their marketing networks are global. 
Foreign investment in mines and resources may be relatively stable, but manufacturing 
plants and assembly sites can be closed down or moved offshore at short notice, while 
bond and portfolio capital is completely footloose. The first point of such economic 
analysis is to recognize how market forces have themselves liberated transnational 
corporations from the control of host states and given domestic-owned companies 
more clout in resisting their governments’ efforts to regulate them, because they, too, 
can go global.
At the same time as information technologies have made possible 24-hour 
currency trading, the global supra-constitution has constrained member states’ abilities 
to reduce their vulnerability to capital flight or even to control the performance of 
companies working within their territories. Host countries can no longer impose 
performance requirements on foreign investments by requiring that the would-be 
investor commit to guaranteeing certain levels of export, employment or technology 
transfer, or of locally purchasing the inputs it needs. States dare not require that their 
corporations’ operations abroad comply with the same standards as at home (for 
example, anti-corruption standards) lest they lose business to competing corporations 
headquartered in other states that are unhindered by moral, ecological or humanitarian 
scruples.
Periodic outcries following individual corporations’ environmental 
catastrophes or corruption scandals have generated occasional pressures to regulate 
particular industries or specific aspects of global business behaviour (for instance, in 
employing child labour). But the political voice of business is so powerful and the 
neoconservative ethos prevailing in governments is so deferential towards the doctrine 
of the invisible hand that voluntary codes of conduct, professions of corporate social 
responsibility and programs of industry self-regulation win out in the competition 
for public legitimacy over more effective mandatory regulation by democratically 
mandated authorities.
The process of privatizing state functions and further empowering 
market forces has important legal aspects. Investor-state dispute settlement under 
NAFTA Chapter 11 is but one manifestation of a more general phenomenon: the 
de-territorialization and privatization of law. This trend can be seen most clearly 
in the expansion, among transnational corporations, of the domain of international 
commercial arbitration known as lex mercatoria, a growing, private legal sphere 
outside the jurisdiction of states.
To service the needs of an expanding transnational marketplace, a legal 
globalization is occurring. With the transnational harmonization of national laws, the 
deeper pervasiveness of international law, the increasing use of model contracts, more 
international arbitration by commercial actors and the incorporation of foreign and 
international law in domestic courts, U.S.-based law firms have gone global to serve 
the needs of large TNCs as they operate in an international context defined by the 
largely U.S.-inspired legal norms entrenched in the WTO.
The strengthening of the strong and weakening of the weak by this 
globalization of the marketplace was not predicted by neoconservative globalism’s 
standard bearers in the 1980s and 1990s. The reality of growing social and economic 
disparities within and between countries has nevertheless provoked reactions within 
global civil society, reactions that have expressed frustration at the consequences of 
de-democratization throughout the world, even if they have not been able to stop, let 
alone reverse, the global momentum of the neo-conservatism from whose impact they 
are suffering.
IV. A CALL FOR ACTION BY BOTH STATE AND CITIZENS
Except for the weakest in the world community, states are not passive objects of 
international pressures or helpless rule takers in a world dominated by great-power rule 
makers. A middle-sized power that, in a favourite academic cliché, has traditionally 
punched above its weight, Canada’s federal and provincial governments have been 
active players in orchestrating their own constitutional constraints internationally 
while abdicating their powers over the domestic market. Rather than affirm that 
the Canadian state has retreated holus-bolus, it is more accurate to say that it has 
voluntarily given up many of its Keynesian regulatory capabilities while asserting 
greater powers to strengthen its police/security capabilities.
Globalization by the State
Beyond heeding the nostrums of neo-conservatism by devolving authority to global 
and continental governance bodies and by privatizing functions that expand the private 
sector’s domain, Canadian governments have voluntarily dismantled their own powers 
by offloading functions to lower levels of government and cutting back the funding 
of existing programs and public-sector organizations. In order to generate their new
weakness, governments have paradoxically had to strengthen themselves both to 
resist the public’s anger at the loss of its previous supports and to assert new powers, 
whether for enhanced anti-terrorism security; stricter immigration controls or better 
equipped armed forces with a new fighting, rather than peacekeeping, mission. In 
this way, Canadian governments have supported the global trend by encouraging the 
international movement of capital and goods while discouraging cross-country flows 
of people.
The picture we have seen emerge is not of a self-castrated Canadian state, but 
one whose normative thrust has shifted from emphasizing its liberal internationalism 
based on a discourse articulated in the values of democracy and equality in order 
to push a markedly more U.S.-style conservatism. Perhaps surprisingly, Liberal 
governments of the 1990s schizophrenically tried to embrace both perspectives, 
however contradictory one was with the other. While its left hand supported 
the development of international law to promote human security by leading the 
negotiation of an antipersonnel landmines treaty and pushing for the establishment of 
a International Criminal Court (ICC), Ottawa’s right hand pursued the agenda of trade 
liberalization by imposing on South Africa the same kind of investor-state dispute 
settlement that Canadian civil society groups had protested against when they came to 
understand the workings of NAFTA Chapter 11.
While responsibility for a good part of Canada’s growing democratic deficit 
can be placed on the shoulders of new global, continental and market governance that 
operates beyond the knowledge of most Canadian citizens and remain inaccessible 
even to the knowledgeable activists, a good deal of Canada’s normative shift has been 
the product of deliberate federal and provincial government strategies. The refusal 
to take the threat of global warming seriously represents two decades of Ottawa’s 
bipartisan denial. Complicity with the American torture of suspected Islamic militants 
started with the Liberal government’s treatment of Maher Arar and has continued with 
the Conservatives government’s refusal to take prisoners from Guantanamo or even to 
extradite Omar Khadr in Canada for his alleged crime.
Another—this time successful—variant of Ottawa’s right hand not knowing 
what its left was doing followed Canada’s loss at Washington’s hands in Geneva 
of the famous Sports Illustrated case. The loss, which nullified several decades of 
public policy that had secured a considerable market for Canadian magazines, led 
the international community to establish an international convention under the United 
Nations Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization designed explicitly to establish 
norms that could be invoked to legitimize state policies aimed at preserving and 
promoting the diversity of cultural expression.
Still an easy target for scorn in the national Anglo-Saxon cultures that are by 
now deeply persuaded by the doctrines of neo-conservatism, cultural protectionism is
hardly a banner behind which states and citizens can rally and gain the support of their 
citizenry. Labour rights and human rights are also slogans that currently have little 
traction beyond the liberal-internationalist elite who still dominate in our faculties of 
law and social science. Equally, talking of an increasing global “democratic deficit” 
has little gravitational power to attract citizens to the barricades.
Our substitute—human emancipation—may not stir many hearts, but it is a 
notion more general than democracy and more centred on the achievement of equality 
and empowerment, which have been the objective of idealistic political thinkers for 
several centuries. This redefined program to stop and roll back the serious increases 
of inequality that characterize the world stage would, we believe, offer a rationale that 
could cause a change of the global neoconservative paradigm and help governments 
and citizens work towards a successful solution of its many crises.
Globalization from Below
In a curious adaptation of Karl Polanyi’s famous theory of the late 19th century’s 
“double movement,” globalization’s constraining effect on state action has stimulated 
vastly increased international activism by citizens and their organizations. In our case, 
even if the Canadian state has been a willing perpetrator of its own self-constraint, 
Canadian citizens are becoming increasingly active participants in their globalized 
world.
In the shorthand of international political economy, “globalization from 
above”—the neoconservative global constitutionalization generated by dominant 
states and their market players—is juxtaposed with the “globalization from below” 
that stems from civil society organizations and popular movements militating for, and 
sometimes achieving, change in the other direction.
In this domain, it still remains true that Canadians punch above their weight. 
The world’s most effective global non-government organization (NGO), Greenpeace, 
was founded in Vancouver in 1970. A Canadian, James Orbinski, was presiding over 
Médecins sans Frontières when it received the Nobel Peace Prize. Maude Barlow is 
iconic, whether as saint or devil, in her leading the Council of Canadians to champion 
such international causes as the universal human right to water in the face of global 
TNCs’ efforts to privatize access to and distribution of water. Another Canadian, 
scholar-cum-activist Janet Conway, did the research and the theorization, and also 
contributed her organizational moxie, to induce Canada’s anti-poverty, Native, 
women’s and labour movements to participate enthusiastically in the World Social 
Forum, from its inception in Brazil to its present global activities.
The distinction between globalization from above and globalization from 
below is far from watertight. Citizen groups pressure governments, and governments
use NGOs to obtain needed policy information and even to implement their policies in 
the field, particularly in the Third World. Fifty thousand demonstrators in the streets of 
Seattle in 1999 first raised public consciousness about the inequities constitutionalized 
in the WTO, whose practices subsequently became somewhat more NGO-friendly. 
It was outrage expressed by civil society that pushed Ottawa to champion a treaty 
banning anti-personnel mines. Ideas from civil society impelled Ottawa to lead the 
way towards the Treaty o f  Rome, which established the ICC. Canadian legal scholars— 
supported by the then-human rights reporter Michael Ignatieff—had much to do with 
the United Nations’ development of its human-security doctrine of responsibility to 
protect.
Like governments, citizens are both objects of globalization and its subjects, 
both passive victims and active movers and shakers. Much of the creativity that has 
generated new forms of soft-law governance has come from the grass roots. Repeated 
failures to push their governments to adopt an effective, state-led international regime 
to preserve the world’s forests caused NGOs to invent, in collaboration with business 
and governments, a complex hybrid known by the infelicitous label “non-state, 
market-led governance.” However awkward the nomenclature, using market forces 
and complex rules (which give the global South equal voice with the global North 
and provide Aboriginals in British Columbia with the weight that their rights over 
vast forests merited) to change disastrous logging practices has been an impressive 
accomplishment by one section of global civil society.
These examples give some sense of what citizens have done to try to correct 
the constitutional and market imbalances that are constraining the regulatory state, 
exacerbating global inequalities and threatening the planet’s survival as a hospitable 
environment for human life. They also suggest a way forward.
Citizen activism is necessary but not sufficient. If the market’s capacity to 
self-destruct is to be contained, governments must get in step with their farther-sighted 
citizenry in order to give effect of priority to human emancipation rather than market 
liberation.
This will entail a rebalancing of the global supra-constitution, a consequent 
rewriting of Canada’s external constitution, and the displacement of presently 
dominant neoconservative values with the articulation and implementation of global 
norms of emancipatory social justice that have always marked the hopes of history’s 
best thinkers. It has happened before with the redesign of global economic institutions 
following World War II and the extraordinary creation of a European supranational 
political entity. Re-establishing symmetry between supranational economic and social 
governance must happen again.
